Your identity in a colored printer printout

Identity in documents

It has been some time since the bygone era of the typewriter. If one can still remember, the source of a typewritten document may be identified by fingerprint impressions on the paper to identify who handled the paper, by the distinct flaws of the typewriter’s typeface to identify the usual user of such specific typewriter, or both. These methods of identification were useful in identifying the principals in the commission of fraud, among other crimes. On the other hand, these methods can also be used in identifying the origins or authors of underground and prohibited self-published literature, whether under a repressive government regime or not. The forensic means, as said, can be used for both legitimate and illegitimate ends, but the consolation remains that the mechanical flaws in a certain typewriter were not made deliberately by the typewriter manufacturer to allow the identification of its owner-possessor-user.

Presently, with the proliferation of low-cost colored printers, and the declining cost of owning a colored laser printer, it is not uncommon that some counterfeiters try to forge legal tender through the use of colored printing technology, and to utter the printouts as money thereafter. Colored laser printers, combined with a reliable scanner, can also replicate other legal or commercial documents, and thus allow the forger to pass the printouts as the genuine documents. Researchers at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, United States of America, for one, have developed a technique to trace a document, i.e. by analyzing a document to identify characteristics that are unique for each printer, and by designing printers to purposely embed individualized characteristics in documents. They detect, through software, slight variations in printed characters, which they call “intrinsic signatures,” revealing subtle differences from one printer model to another. ^{[ 1 ]}

Printer codes

Another manner of detecting which printer a printout originated was reported on 26 October 2004, in the magazine PC World with an article therein entitled “Dutch track counterfeits via printer serial numbers.” The article pointed out that every printout contains a hidden code, which in turn contains information about the computer printer that it was printed on. Even if modern printers are of different brands, their print engines are made by only a few companies, such as Toshiba, Canon and Ricoh; and that it is the engine that has its own identity that can be traced ^{[ 2 ]} Most consumers are unaware of this feature until recently, but most government agencies are aware of this for some time. Seth Schoen, a technologist who led the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) research, said he had seen the coding on documents produced by printers that were at least a decade old. ^{[ 3 ]}

The built-in security is composed of dots. “The dots are yellow, less than one millimeter in diameter, and are typically repeated over each page of a document. In order to see the pattern, one needs a blue light, a magnifying glass, or a microscope,” ^{[ 4 ]} Schoen revealed. The pattern indicates a unique number that is printed on every color page. The number determines to what country a specific printer has been delivered, and to what dealer. The dealer then can lead investigators to the local computer store where the printer was sold. ^{[ 5 ]} The EFF has cracked the codes of a particular line of Xerox printers but has observed similar marking in Hewlett Packard (HP) printers, among others. EFF looked at printer output under a blue light, and found yellow dot markings in Brother HL-4200CN printer; Canon CLC 1000, CLC 2400, CLC 4000, Color imageRUNNER C3100CN, Color imageRUNNER C3200, and Color imageRUNNER C3220 printers; Dell 3000cn, 3100cn, and 5100cn printers; Epson AcuLaser C900, C1100, C1500, and C1900 printers; HP Color Laserjet 1500l, 2500, 2500n, 2550l, 2550n, 2600n, 2680, 2840, 3500, 3500n, 3600dn, 3700, 3700dn, 3700n, 4600, 4600dn, 4600hdn, 4600n, 4650, 4650dn, 4650dtn, 5100cn, 5500, 5500atn, 5500dn, 5500hdn, 5550, 5550dtn, 9500 printers; Konica/Minolta Bizhub C350, CF1501, Colorforce 8050, Desklaser 2200, DialtaColor CF 2001, Ikon CPP500E, Magicolor 2210, Magicolor 2300 DL, Magicolor 2430 DL, Magicolor 3300, Magicolor 7300 printers; Kyocera FS-C5016N printer; Lanier LD238C, and LP125cx/LP126cn printers; Lexmark C510, C720, and C912 printers; Ricoh Aficio CL 3000, Aficio CL 6010, Aficio CL 7000, and AP 206 printers; Savin C3210 and CLP35 printers; Tektronix eStudio 3511 printer; Xerox DocuColor 12, DocuColor 40, DocuColor 2045, DocuColor 6060, WorkCentre M24. WorkCenter Pro 40, and WorkCenter Pro C2636 printers. On the other hand, the press report that Epson AcuLaser C1100 printer and all models of Xerox WorkCentre Pro print tracking codes. Lastly, the manufacturer admitted that the following printers print tracking codes: Tektronix eStudio 210c, eStudio 310c, eStudio 311c, eStudio 211c, eStudio 2100c, eStudio 3100c, FC15i, FC15, FC22i, FC22, FC25Pi, FC25P, FC70, printers; and Xerox DocuColor 2000, and DocuColor 6060 printers. ^{[ 6 ]}

The United States Secret Service acknowledged that the markings exist but played down its use for invading privacy. Agency spokesman Eric Zahren announced that the markings merely serve as “a countermeasure to prevent illegal activity specific to counterfeiting,” and ” to protect our currency and to protect people’s hard-earned money.” ^{[ 7 ]} On the other hand, EFF Senior Staff Attorney Lee Tien noted that “Underground democracy movements that produce political or religious pamphlets and flyers, like the Russian samizdat of the 1980s, will always need the anonymity of simple paper documents, but this technology makes it easier for governments to find dissenters, Even worse, it shows how the government and private industry make backroom deals to weaken our privacy by compromising everyday equipment like printers.” ^{[ 8 ]}

Right of privacy

Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to stop information about themselves from becoming known to people other than those they choose to give the information to. The right against unsanctioned intrusion of privacy by the government, corporations or individuals is part of many countries’ laws, and in some cases, constitutions (such as France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen). ^{[ 9 ]} Further, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 12, states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

In the Philippines, on the other hand, in the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], the Philippine Supreme Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated that

“The right to privacy is constitutionally protected. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: ‘The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector —protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual —has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of technological age —industrialization, urbanization, and organization —operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.’” ^{[ 10 ]}

Consumer concerns

Identification of the printer origin of a colored printout ultimate points to the identification of the owner of the printer. The means to identify a felon through certain encrypted codes in a printed output may be said to be legitimate, but the same means may serve as a prior restraint against any other person from airing criticisms or other utterances against entities that may have the propensity to resort to extra-legal remedies to suppress such expression. Truly, although it may be clear that the means was in furtherance of an important government interest in the United States – and parallel to the government interest of other countries relating to counterfeit notes, i.e. including the Philippines – and that said interest is primarily unrelated to the suppression of freedom of expression, there may be controversy whether the incidental restriction on the freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. It may be contended that the government interest, sought to be promoted, can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. ^{[ 11 ]} By the way things are, one should be printing his legitimate criticisms against known political personalities in some other printer that does not print the encrypted yellow dots.

On the other hand, leaving consumers in the dark as to marks that identify device purchasers is an insidious means to achieve a certain purpose without regard to its pregnant potential for abuse. Its continued practice, further, is contradictory to the current trend where sellers provide privacy terms in their products, to make the consumer aware of the pertinent personal information the latter is willing to divulge. Such insidious practice divests an ordinary person from consciously assuming risks – such as those made with the use of computers and mobile phones – and from limiting liabilities for ambiguous acts – such as currency printouts for a school report.

Lastly, the words of EFF Senior Staff Attorney Lee Tien ring true when he said that “it shows that the government and private industry make backroom deals to weaken our privacy by compromising everyday equipment like printers. The logical next question is: what other deals have been or are being made to ensure that our technology rats on us?” ^{[ 12 ]} Just imagine the possibility and effects of encrypted marks on digital photography and videography, if government would pursue such measure for a supposedly legitimate government interest.

Conclusion

The Consumer Act of the Philippines, promulgated on 13 April 1992, does not contain consumer protection as to privacy issues, although the powers of the National Consumer Affairs Commission include that which recommends new policies and legislation or amendments to existing ones, ^{[ 13 ]} i.e. pertaining to consumer protection. The Philippines has not pursued a path somehow oriented towards the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data – such as those embodied in the guidelines promulgated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), circa 1980 – or a path parallel to the initiatives of the United States, ironically as to this article, through its Federal Trade Commission and Department of Commerce, as to fair information practices. The Philippine government should now be addressing, as it should have had before, advanced consumer issues besides those directly related to usual items in store shelves. It cannot actively indulge itself in techno-rhetoric while being complacently backward in its policies as to matters of technology.

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Endnotes

^{1. De Vries, Wilbert. “Dutch track counterfeits via printer serial numbers” WebWereld Netherlands. 26 October 2004, PC World HTML Developer’s Guide Dutch track counterfeits via printer serial numbers PC World, © 2005 IDG Communications. Retrieved 20 October 2005. http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/index.php/id;1002274598}

2. Ibid.

3. Musgrove, Mike. “Sleuths Crack Tracking Code Discovered in Color Printers,” 19 October 2005. Washington Post Company. Retrieved 21 October 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/18/AR200510...

4. Secret Code in Color Printers Lets Government Track You: Tiny Dots Show Where and When You Made Your Print 17 October 2005, EFF Breaking News: Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved 21 October 2005. http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2005_10.php#004063

5. De Vries, Wilbert. “Dutch track counterfeits via printer serial numbers”. Ibid.

6. List of Printers Which Do or Don’t Print Tracking Dots. Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved 21 October 2005. www.eff.org/Privacy/printers/list.php

7. Musgrove, Mike. “Sleuths Crack Tracking Code Discovered in Color Printers,” Ibid.

8. Secret Code in Color Printers Lets Government Track You. Ibid.

9. Privacy. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved 25 October 2005. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy

10. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) as to U.S. Supreme Court declaration regarding the right to privacy.

11. See Social Weather Station vs. Comelec. GR 147571, 5 May 2001, citing U.S. vs. O’Brien, 391 US 365, as to the O’Brien test.

12. Secret Code in Color Printers Lets Government Track You. Ibid.

13. Article 153 (b), Republic Act 7394, The Consumer Act of the Philippines