Haystack: Vda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy (GR L-63277, 29 November 1983)

Vda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy
[G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.]
Second Division, Escolin (J): 5 concur, 1 concur in result

Facts: The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the deceased's name, located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased and occupied by Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first 5 days of the month. On 28 August 1982, Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a resident of Cebu City, served upon Vda. de Borromeo a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to September 1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises.

As Vda. de Borromeo failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on 16 September 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City (Civil Case R-23915, assigned to the sala of Judge Julian B. Pogoy). On 12 November 1982, Vda. de Borromeo moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the want of jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of Atty. Reyes’ failure to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law). The judge denied the motion to dismiss. Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, Vda. de Borromeo came to the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and ordered the judge to try and decide Civil Case R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.

1. Period to file action for accion interdictal
Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises.

2. Justification of the direct filing of the case to court on the ground that the action may be barred by Statute of Limitations is untenable
In the present, the letter-demand was dated 28 August 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent 9 months within which to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted that the case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

3. PD 1508 makes conciliation process at Barangay level a condition precedent to filing of actions
With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies.

4. Circular 22 (9 November 1979, CJ Enrique M. Fernando)
Circular 22 was addressed to all judges of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Courts of Agrarian Relations, City Court, Municipal Court and their Clerks of Court. It reads “Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons."

5. Pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by Clerk of Court has been overcome by disclosure as to lack of certification
While the Judge acknowledged Circular 22 in his order of 14 December 1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case R-23915 to allege compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which has been sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint.

6. Conciliation under PD 1508, however, applies only to individuals; Individual defined
Under Section 4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals". An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

7. Administrator merely a nominal party’ Estate remains to be real party in interest
Atty. Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in the case is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person, the administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

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