Haystack: Ginete vs. Court of Appeals (GR 127596, 24 September 1998)

Ginete vs. CA
[G.R. No. 127596. September 24, 1998.]
Resolution Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur

Facts: Arnold Ginete, Flor Ginete assisted by Jose Bontigao, and Nora Ginete assisted by Ricardo Sabayle [petitioners] filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and for Partition against Josefina Ribaya-Ginete, Victor and Alex, both surnamed Ginete, Eudarlio B. Valencia and Mirafe Bellen-Valencia [private respondents]. The petitioners allege that the lots located in Bulan, Sorsogon (59 hectares) were originally conjugal properties of the deceased spouses Mauricio Ginete and Aniceta Ginga who had 6 children, one of whom was Onofre (or Odelon) Ginete, now deceased. They claim to be legitimate children of the late Onofre Ginete by his first wife, Beatriz Tamboong. According to them, when Mauricio Ginete died, his surviving heirs submitted a project of partition wherein the subject lots were apportioned to Onofre (Odelon) Ginete. During the lifetime of Onofre and after the death of his first wife Beatriz Tamboong, they occupied some of the lots at the instance of the former. On the other hand, private respondents contend that the subject lots originally belonged solely to Aniceta Ginga who subsequently sold 2 of the 7 lots to Josefina Ribaya-Ginete, the second wife of Onofre (Odelon). After Onofre's (Odelon's) death, Aniceta sold another lot to Onofre's (Odelon's) acknowledged natural children. Then, Josefina Ribaya-Ginete redeemed 3 lots from one Rufina Gacis and thereafter sold the same to Mirafe Bellen Valencia, Aniceta's daughter by her second husband and Odelon's half-sister. Said lots were subsequently titled in the name of Mirafe Valencia married to Eudarlio Valencia. After hearing both sides, the trial court, on 29 June 1992, ruled in favor of private respondents and declared them owners of the entire 59 hectares of subject lots. Petitioners were ordered to pay the former P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and necessary litigation expenses. In addition, petitioners were ordered to pay actual damages of P183,600.00 representing the value of the coconuts and/or proceeds of the fruits from the parcels (or portions) they have been occupying since 1975 up to 1992, specifically parcels 2, 3 (portion), 4, 5 and 6 plus P10,200.00 per annum effective 1993 until they finally vacate and turn over the possession thereof to private respondents and to the pay the costs.

Having received the above decision on 22 September 1992, petitioners had until 7 October 1992 to file a notice of appeal. Petitioners eventually filed a notice of appeal on 5 October 1992. Said notice was acted upon and given due course by Presiding Judge Ireneo B. Escandor on 8 October 1992 in view of the retirement of Judge Alparce on 30 June 1992. However, Judge Escandor inhibited himself and withdrew his 8 October 1992 order giving due course to the appeal for an unspecified reason. Instead, Judge Simon S. Encinas acted upon and gave due course to the appeal on 26 January 1993.

The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the appeal in a 16 June 1995 Resolution for failure of petitioners to file appellants' brief. Petitioners' counsel received the resolution on 3 July 1995. As such, the last day for the filing of a motion for reconsideration would have been on 18 July 1995. Corrollarily, said resolution would have attained finality on 19 July 1995. On 1 August 1995, petitioners filed their Appellants' Brief. A Motion for Reconsideration dated 18 July 1995 was allegedly filed together with the Appellants' Brief but received by the Court of Appeals only on 29 December 1995. On 8 December 1995, the Court of Appeals ordered entry of judgment and expunction of Appellants' Brief after verifying that no Motion for Reconsideration was filed with the Court of Appeals. Nor was an appeal to the Supreme Court filed. Petitioners moved to reconsider the 8 December 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. On 26 January 1996, the Court of Appeals ordered the release of entry of judgment after a verification report dated 16 January 1996 revealed that only the Appellants' Brief was received on 31 August 1995 but without the Motion for Reconsideration. On 18 December 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for leave to file and admit incorporated omnibus motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to release entry of judgment.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court assailing 4 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The 16 June 1995 Resolution dismissed petitioners' appeal for their failure to file Appellants' Brief despite the extension given. The 8 December 1995 Resolution ordered entry of judgment on the ground that the 16 June 1995 Resolution had already become final and executory, there being no Motion for Reconsideration filed contesting the dismissal of the appeal. The 26 January 1996 Resolution ordered the release of entry of judgment while the 18 December 1996 Resolution denied petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and reiterated the order of release of entry of judgment.

The Supreme Court set aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated 16 June 1995 dismissing the appeal; that dated 8 December 1995 ordering entry of judgment; that dated 26 January 1996 ordering release of entry of judgment, and finally that dated 18 December 1996 ordering release of entry of judgment in CA GR CV 43573; and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals which is directed to admit petitioners' Appellants' Brief, to give due course to their Appeal and decide the same on the merits. No costs.

1. Notice of appeal seasonably filed
Records show that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period. As such, it was seasonably filed.

2. Distinction between failure to file notice of appeal within reglementary period and failure to file brief within period granted by appellate court
A distinction should be made between failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period and failure to file brief within the period granted by the appellate court. The former would result in the failure of the appellate court to obtain jurisdiction of the appealed decision resulting in its becoming final and executory upon failure to move for reconsideration. The latter would simply result in the abandonment of the appeal which could lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its reconsideration. Consequently, the appealed decision would become final and executory but prior thereto, the appellate court shall have obtained jurisdiction of the appealed decision. Herein, petitioners simply failed to file the Appellants' Brief within the extended period accorded to them after the appellate court had obtained jurisdiction of the case.

3. Illustration of distinction; Carco Motor Sales vs. CA citing Gregorio vs. CA
In Carco Motor Sales v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "As held by the Court in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), '(T)he expiration of the time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not a jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties. Even after the expiration of the time fixed for the filing of the brief, the reviewing court may grant an extension of time, at least where no motion to dismiss has been made. Late filing or service of briefs may be excused where no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by reason of the delay or where there is no contention that the appellee's cause was prejudiced."

4. Petitioner’s former counsel failure to file Appellant’s Brief within reglementary period constitutes gross negligence
Counsels are sworn to protect the interest of their clients and in the process, should be knowledgeable about the rules of procedure to avoid prejudicing the interests of their clients or worse, compromising the integrity of the courts. Ignorance of the procedural rules on their part is tantamount to inexcusable negligence. The matter before the Court, however, does not even call for counsel's knowledge of procedural rules but merely his managerial skill in keeping track of deadlines for filing necessary pleadings, failing which, he can opt to withdraw from the case in order not to prejudice further his client's interest. Failure of petitioners' former counsel to file the Appellants' Brief within the reglementary period constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Failure of petitioners' former counsel to file Appellants' Brief clearly manifests his negligence which became more pronounced when he was granted an extended period of time within which to file the brief.

5. Similar instance of gross negligence: Perla Compania de Seguros vs. Saquilabon
In Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc. v. Atty. Benedicto G. Saquilabon, the Supreme Court held that "An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People v Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515)."

6. Act or omission of counsel generally binds clients; Exception: justice and equity
Ordinarily, a negligent act or omission on the part of counsel would, as a rule, have bound his clients. Under the prevailing circumstances and in the interest of justice and equity, the Court cannot strictly apply the same rule in the case before it.

7. Prerogative of the Supreme Court to suspend its own rules
The Supreme Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to appellant's failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would the Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal has been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases.

8. Instance when Court relaxed rules: Republic vs. CA
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, although the appeal was perfected six days after the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court ordered the Court of Appeals to entertain the same, as the Republic stood to lose close to 300 hectares of land already titled in its name and used exclusively for educational purposes.

9. Reason for the present relaxation of the rules
Herein, petitioners stand to lose their alleged rightful share in the inheritance consisting of fifty-nine hectares of land just because their former counsel failed to file the Appellants' Brief within the reglementary period. To deprive petitioners of their share in the inheritance due to the negligence of their counsel coupled with their submissions of the trial court's failure to appreciate and consider some of their evidence, documentary at that, are sufficient demonstrations of the merits of their case.

10. Circumstances which may demonstrate merit of case
While the Court would not readily accept petitioners' allegation that the trial court's decision was drafted by one of the private respondents who happened to be the Executive Judge exercising supervisory functions over the branch where the instant case was being heard, it cannot be overlooked that this particular situation may have engendered some justifiable suspicion in the mind of petitioners. While such an allegation, coupled with the allegation that another intervenor was also a judge, as well as the belief that the reason they kept on changing their lawyers was because their lawyers were intimidated by private respondents who were judges, or that the lawyers themselves refused to accept their case, are bereft of concrete proof, still they may not entirely be without merit. In fact, the Appellants' Brief, belatedly filed with the Court of Appeals, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration, was signed by petitioners themselves claiming that the lawyer who drafted the same refused to sign his name. The above circumstances, taken cumulatively, are sufficient demonstration of the merits of their case, hence must be given due course if only to dispel from the minds of petitioners, as well as the public, the image of partiality of our courts, as well as to determine definitively the ownership over the subject parcels of land.

11. Substantial justice and fair play underlying principle in the administration of justice and application of rules
Justice Teehankee, in his concurring opinion in Republic v. Court of Appeals, stated that the Court cited in Paulino vs. CA “inter alia the demands of substantial justice and the presence of special circumstances for giving due course to the appeal and reiterated that '(T)he underlying principle in the administration of justice and application of the rules is substantial justice and fair play. As restated by the Court in Obut v. Court of Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), '(W)e cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."

12. Rules of procedure mere tools to facilitate the attainment of justice
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which the Court itself has already declared to be final. Thus, the court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of the ends of justice. For when the operation of the Rules will lead to an injustice we have, in justifiable instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent it. If their application and operation tend to subvert and defeat, instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justified.

13. Rules promulgated to set forth guidelines in dispensation of justice and not to bind and chain that dispenses it
The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering justice have always been conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around.

14. Technicality should not defeat substantive right of other party
Technicality should not be relied upon to subject and defeat substantive rights of the other party. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.

15. Elements considered in suspending rules
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. On the whole, the principal considerations in giving due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules are substantial justice and equity considerations. But the above-cited elements should likewise be considered for the appeal to be reinstated and given due course.

16. Decision final and executory when no motion for reconsideration filed within reglementary period
The statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course is to be strictly enforced. The Court has held that the necessity for such a requirement is considered an indispensable interdiction against needless delays and for the orderly discharge of judicial business.

17. Rationale behind the statutory requirement of filing MR within reglementary period
As can be inferred from the case of Legarda v. Court of Appeals, the purposes for such a statutory requirement are two-fold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and; second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. The first purpose is in line with the dictum that justice delayed is justice denied. But said dictum presupposes that the court properly appreciates the facts and the applicable law to arrive at a judicious decision. The end should always be the meting out of justice. As to the second purpose, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. It must be adjudicated properly and seasonably to better serve the ends of justice and to place everything in proper perspective. In the process, the possibility that errors may be committed in the rendition of a decision cannot be discounted.

18. Final judgment not disturbed when due process was observed
The Court will not disturb a final and executory judgment even at the risk that errors may have been committed in its rendition as long as due process was observed.

19. Due process defined
Due process means giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard and the Court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor. It has been held that as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.

20. Findings of the lower court, and not due process, issue
Herein, there is no dispute that petitioners were given every opportunity to be heard. What was made an issue before the Court of Appeals was the misappreciation of facts and misapplication of laws despite clear and uncontroverted evidence. In effect, petitioners claim that they would be deprived of their rightful shares of their inheritance if their appeal is not reinstated and the findings of fact made by the lower court are not reviewed.

21. Lower court may have erred
In the Court's perusal of the records of the case, it appears that the lower court disregarded and misappreciated certain documents presented by petitioners in proving filiation as allowed by the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. Second, it seems to have misapplied the established presumptions in cases of marriage and filiation. Third, the forgery of the signature of the Notary Public in one of the questioned Deeds of Sale appears to have been clearly established by petitioners and unsatisfactorily and insufficiently rebutted by private respondents.

22. Court of Appeals to review; Supreme Court will not preempt CA in the review of factual findings
Due to the circumstances, it is imperative for the Court of Appeals to review the findings of fact made by the trial court. For while the Court may review factual findings of the lower court, it will not preempt the Court of Appeals in reviewing the same and reappreciating the evidence presented by petitioners to resolve factual questions. Prior resolution of the issues is necessary in order to determine the question of original ownership over the subject parcels of land which in turn would resolve the question of succession. Said questions pertain to factual matters that could best be resolved by the Court of Appeals which is mandated to examine and review the findings of fact made by the lower court.

The demands of substantial justice and fair play make it absolutely necessary for the courts to completely, judiciously and satisfactorily resolve said questions of fact. Failure to give due course to the appeal and to resolve those questions might give rise to the impression that the courts may be fostering and promoting injustice if and when the appellants' or petitioners' case turns out to be meritorious.

23. Court of Appeals itself doubtful whether a motion for reconsideration was filed with the Appellants’ Brief; Greater prejudice would be avoided if appeal given due course
The Court of Appeals itself is doubtful as to whether a motion for reconsideration of the 16 June 1995 resolution which dismissed petitioners' appeal was filed together with the Appellants' Brief. While the Appellants' Brief was indeed filed late, the Court of Appeals, in its 8 December 1995 resolution stated that the said brief was filed on 1 August 1995, thirteen days after the supposed last day for filing a motion for reconsideration. However in its 26 January 1996 resolution, it stated that according to the Judicial Records Division Report, the Appellants' Brief was received and dated 31 August 1995. While the Court of Appeals itself appears unsure as to whether petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of its appeal within the reglementary period, greater prejudice would be avoided if petitioners' appeal is reinstated and given due course. Petitioners would be made to return the fruits in addition to payment of damages as well as P10,200.00 per annum effective 1993 until they finally vacate and turn over possession of the subject parcels of land to private respondents in case the appellate court upholds the decision of the lower court. If the appellate court reverses the decision of the lower court and adjudges petitioners as entitled to a share in the subject parcels of land, then private respondents shall not have lost anything.

24. Balance of fairness and general rules
There is danger to real justice that inheres in the concepts of "fairness" and "general rules"; the hurt done by the sharp corners of an angular legal structure, the hospitality to tyranny that lies in easy disregard of rules. Both ideas are needed — adherence to abstractions that override the inclinations (bad or good) of those who make decisions, attention to the requirements of special situations. From time to time, one or the other becomes too prominent. Then there is clamor for its counterpart.

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