Haystack: Vda. De Nazareno v. Court of Appeals (GR 98045, 26 June 1996)

Vda. De Nazareno v. CA
[G.R. No. 98045. June 26, 1996.]
Second Division, Romero (J): 4 concur

Facts: A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City is said to have been formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Sometime in 1979, Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against Salasalan and Rabaya, which decision was affirmed by the RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 20. The case was remanded to the Municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 and subsequently, a case for certiorari for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25; both of which were dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied.

Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands. The report of the Land Investigator, made in compliance with the order of the District Land Officer, recommended the Survey Plan MSI-10-06-000571-D (Lot 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public application. Based on the report, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering an amendment to the survey plain of Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of Lands; which was denied.

The petitioners Desamparada vda. De Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazero filed a case before the RTC, branch 22, for the annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding the parcel of land. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, resulting to the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Hence, the petition.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

1. Accretion belongs to the riparian owners; requisites
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." In the case of Meneses v. CA, it was held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.

2. Alluvion in present case not accumulated by action of waters or current
The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the present case as the first and second requirements of the rules were not met. Thus, the Nazarenos cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. By their own admission, the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.

3. Current defined
In Hilario v. City of Manila, it was held that the word "current" indicate the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.

4. Petitioners estopped in the denying the public character of land and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands
Petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan MSI-10-06-000571-D which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was controverted by the findings of the ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River.

5. Findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their jurisdiction final; not reviewable by the Courts
The Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by the Supreme Court.

6. Similar cases where alluvion is artificial; Man-made accretion part of public domain
In Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the requirement that the deposit should due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Article 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In the present case, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. As the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part of the public domain.

7. Subject land being public, Bureau of Lands and Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction
The subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law.

8. Administrative remedies exhausted; Regional Director of Bureau of Lands’ decision entered for and by authority of the Director of Lands
Administrative remedies have been exhausted in the present case. It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for and by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands.

9. Undersecretary of Department of Agricultural and Natural Resources has authority to review decisions or orders of the Director of lands with respect to public lands under the administration of the Bureau and the Department
In the case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, it was held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to question involving public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Public Land Law (CA 141). Section 3 provides that "the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate control,” while Section 4 provides that “subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." In the present case, when Rolleo Ignacio acted on the motion for reconsideration of the late Antonio Nazareno, he was acting on said motion as an Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; notwithstanding the fact that he was an “Officer-in-charge” of the Bureau of Lands.

10. Execution order does not award portions of subject land to private respondents but merely segregated the petitioner’s titled land from the subject land; Does not bar petitioner’s application
It is incorrect for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private respondents Salasalans and Rayabas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over the subject land. The execution order merely directed the segregation of petitioners’ titled lot from the subject land which was actually being occupied by private respondents before they were ejected from it. Based on the finding that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the exercise of this administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the subject land on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants thereof. Palad's (Director of Land) execution order merely implements Hilario's order. It should be noted that petitioners’ own application still has to be given due course.

11. Director of Lands authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession, disposition and management of lands of the public domain; Error in judgment not annullable by certiorari
The Director of Lands is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact. In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, it was held that where, in the disposition of public lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, but not an act or grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari.

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