Haystack: Navarro vs. Court of Appeals (GRs 112389-90, 1 August 1994)

Navarro vs. CA
[G.R. Nos. 112389-90. August 1, 1994.]
First Division, Cruz (J): 3 concurring, 1 on leave

Facts: Mercedes D. Navarro was convicted of violating BP 22 in Criminal Cases L-3848 and L-3849 in the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan. She went to the Court of Appeals. In a motion dated 15 September 1992, she asked for an extension of 90 days from 17 September 1992, within which to file her brief. The motion was granted. However, she failed to file her brief within the extension, and even beyond. On 9 February 1993, the appellate court dismissed her appeal pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. On 1 March 1993, Navarro filed a motion for new trial on the ground of "newly-discovered evidence." This was denied on 9 June 1993. On 5 July 1993, Navarro filed a motion of reconsideration, but this was denied on 20 October 1993. Hence, the petition for review before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals, with costs against Navarro.

1. Navarro’s appeal correctly dismissed
As Navarro filed only a notice of appeal and not an appellant's brief, her appeal was correctly dismissed for lack of interest in prosecuting it.

2. Rule 124, Section 14 of the Rules of Court; Motion for new trial filed within period fixed under the Rule
Rule 124, Sec. 14, of the Rules of Court provides “At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence material to his defense, the motion to conform to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 121.” In the present case, the motion for new trial was filed with the Court of Appeals after the dismissal of the appeal for non-filing of the appellant's brief. The dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the accused or his counsel unless the period is suspended by a motion for new trial. At the time the motion for new trial was filed by Navarro with the appellate court, the resolution dismissing the appeal (and thus affirming the judgment of the trial court) had not yet become final. Navarro received notice of the resolution on 17 February 1993. The judgment became final on 5 March 1993. The motion for new trial was filed on 1 March 1993, within the period fixed under Rule 124. In fact, the appellate court itself admitted that its resolution dismissing the appeal "had not yet become final when the motion for new trial was filed."

3. Lost appeal cannot be retrieved by a motion for new trial
It would appear that Navarro decided to file the motion for new trial only when she received a copy of the resolution of the appellate court dismissing her appeal. After the alleged accidental meeting with the saleslady to whom she claims to have made payment, Navarro had taken no step, either by herself or her counsel, to manifest before the Court of Appeals that she was filing a motion for new trial because of "newly-discovered evidence." Neither did she move to have her appeal reinstated after it was dismissed, nor did she offer any explanation for her failure to file her brief. It was only on 1 March 1993, on more than 60 days after the lapse of the 90-day extension granted by the appellate court, that she filed her motion for new trial. Navarro probably hoped that her lost appeal could be retrieved by a motion for new trial. It was not to be so.

4. “New evidence” corroborative only and cannot overturn judgment of conviction
The appellate court did not exercise its discretion capriciously or whimsically because the so-called "new-discovered evidence," if admitted, would at most have been corroborative only. It is not so substantial a character as to overturn the judgment of conviction. The alleged newly-discovered evidence would have made a difference if the date of payment made by Navarro to Tamayo's saleslady had been stated therein, to prove that payment was made within 5 banking days from notice of the dishonor of the checks. The prima facie presumption laid down in BP 22 that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds at the time of the issuance of the check would have been rebutted. The alleged payment would have precluded the filing of the charges were it not for the significant fact that the receipt was undated.

5. Elements of offense punished in BP 22
The elements of the offense punished in BP 22 are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check of apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (c) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

6. Payment of value of check within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense
Payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense. The prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the issuance and on its presentment for payment is rebutted by such payment. This defense lies regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution to prove the elements of the offense. In the present case, Navarro failed to overcome the presumption by substantiating her allegation of payment. There is no proof that the payment, if it was really made at all, was done within 5 days from the notice of dishonor.

7. People vs. Baquiran; Evidence must be credible by itself, besides that it proceeds from the mouth of a credible itself
There is a legal maxim that evidence to be credible must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind (People vs. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451). In the present case, it was rather strange why Navarro did not immediately inform the complaining witness that she had already paid the amounts covered by the checks when oral as well as written demands were made to her before the filing of the cases. It was likewise hard to believe that Navarro will just pay and give the sum of P28,750 to a mere saleslady of the complainant without any receipt.

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