Haystack: Ibasco vs. Court of Appeals (GR 117488, 5 September 1996)

Ibasco vs. CA
[G.R. No. 117488. September 5, 1996.]
Third Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concurring

Facts: Maria Negro Trivinio and her late husband Manuel Trivinio operate an animal feed mill in Gumaca, Quezon while Santiago Ibasco and his wife operate a piggery in Daet, Camarines Norte. On 26 October 1983, Ibasco and his wife, came to the residence of the Trivinios at Sitio Seawall, Bgy. Camohaguin, Gumaca, Quezon and requested credit accommodation for the supply of ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds. In accordance with the agreed credit arrangement, the Trivinios made 3 deliveries of darak with a total value of P51,566.49 and in payment, Ibasco issued 3 postdated checks, to wit: (1) Check 41909, postdated 24 February 1984, for P15,576.30; (2) Check 41910, postdated 23 March 1984 for P17,900.00, and (3) Check 41911, postdated 18 April 1984 for P18,090.10. All checks were drawn against United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Daet Branch. Upon presentment to the Bank for payment of their due dates, the checks bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds. The Trivinio spouses notified Ibasco of the dishonor. Ibasco replied by telegram offering his real property in Daet as security. Ibasco invited the Trivinios to come to Daet and inspect the property. When the Trivinios arrived in Daet the accused told them that the property is across the sea, and, not wanting to cross the sea, the couple did not anymore inspect the property.

For Ibasco’s failure to settle his account with the Trivinios, criminal cases were filed against Ibasco (Criminal cases 2755-G to 2757-G dated 31 March 1987) for violation of BP 22. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Upon arraignment, Ibasco pleaded not guilty to the charges. After the presentation of the evidence for both parties had been concluded, the trial court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, before submitting his memorandum, Ibasco's new counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since, it is claimed, the checks were "prepared, issued and delivered to the payee at the office of the accused in Daet, Camarines Norte." In its order of 14 November 1991, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. On 17 December 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision 11 dated 20 November 1991 convicting Ibasco, and sentencing him to 1 Year imprisonment and a fine of P36,180.20 in Criminal Case 2755-G, 1 Year imprisonment and a fine of P35,800.00 in Criminal Case 2756-G, and 1 year imprisonment and a fine of P31,152.60 in Ciriminal Case 2757-G.

Ibasco seasonably appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 13300). In its challenged decision of 11 August 1994, the Court of Appeals rejected Ibasco’s claims and affirmed in toto the trial court's decision. Ibasco’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition for review.

The Supreme Court, in its resolution of 31 May 1995, denied the petition for failure of Ibasco to show any reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. Ibasco sought a reconsideration primarily on the basis of Co vs. Court of Appeals. In the Court’s resolution of 7 August 1995, it granted the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the petition. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2755-G, 2756-G, and 2757-G; with costs against Ibasco.

1. BP 22 a continuing offense; Jurisdiction or venue determined by allegation in information; People vs. Grospe
As held in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154, a violation of BP 22 is an offense that appears to be continuing in nature. The knowledge on the part of maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. As pointed out in People vs. Manzanilla, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegation in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). In the present case, it appears that the 3 checks were deposited in Lucena City.

2. Ruling in People vs. Grospe reiterated in Lim vs. Rodrigo
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Lim vs. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487, where it was held that “in People v. Hon. Manzanilla, it was held that as "violation of the bad checks act is committed when one 'makes or draws and issues any check [sic] to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time issue that he does not have sufficient funds' or having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank," "knowledge" is an essential ingredient of the offense charge. As defined by the statute, knowledge, is, by itself, a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another.

3. BP 22 applies to bouncing checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligation, law did not distinguish
A violation of BP 22 should be distinguished from estafa under Article 315 (2) [d] of the Revised Penal Code. BP 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for deposit only, for it makes no distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation and the history of its enactment evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing.

4. Prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds when issuing check
The mere issuance of a dishonored check gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the check without sufficient funds.

5. Ministry Circular 4 of DOJ (15 December 1981) reversed by Ministry Circular 12 (8 August 1984)
The Ministry Circular 4 issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 15 December 1981, provides (2.3.4: Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22) that “Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of the obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22.” Such circular was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular 12 issued on 8 August 1984, which admitted its misinterpretation of BP 22. Thus it announced “henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its administrative interpretation of a statute, but that its new interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn. 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection will no longer be considered as a valid defense.”

6. Transitory crime may be tried where offense is in part committed; People vs. Yabut
Violation of BPs 22 is in the nature of a continuing crime. Venue is determined by the place where the elements of making, issuing, or drawing of the check and delivery thereof are committed. Thus, as explained in People vs. Yabut, 29 "[t]he theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. . . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation."

7. Supreme Court does not disturb findings of trial court on credibility of witness; Testimony of credible witness sufficient to convict
Where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering it was in a better position to settle such issue. Indeed, the trial court has the advantage of hearing the witness and observing his conduct during trial, circumstances which carry a great weight in appreciating his credibility. In the present case, Maria Negro, in her testimony, categorically stated that the three checks were delivered by Ibasco to their residence in Gumaca, Quezon. The Court found no oversight on the part of the trial court in giving credence to the testimony of Maria Negro.The testimony of a lone witness, when credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to convict. Besides, it is not without convincing reason to believe that delivery of the checks was in fact made at Gumaca, Quezon, it being the place of business of the late Manuel Trivinio and from where the animal feeds were delivered. Consequently, payment should be considered effected at Gumaca, Quezon.

8. Magno vs. CA not applicable
Defense of accommodation cannot exculpate Ibasco from his wrongdoing. The case of Magno is inapplicable to him as the material operative facts therein obtaining are different from those established in the present petition. In Magno, the bounced checks were issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier of the goods is also able to sell or lease the same goods at the same time privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus becomes an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value. Also, in Magno, the payee in the former was made aware of the insufficiency of the funds prior to the issuance of the checks.

9. Co vs. CA not applicable
In Co vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that dishonored checks issued prior to 8 August 1984 to guarantee or secure payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, are governed by Circular No. 4 of 15 December 1981 of the DOJ and the drawer thereof cannot be liable for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22. This is not so in the present case, as Ibasco, although he issued the checks prior to 8 August 1984, they were issued in payment of his indebtedness, and not for the accommodation of the Trivinios nor security of their indebtedness.

10. Accommodation and Guarantee defined
Accommodation pertains to an arrangement made a favor to another, not upon a consideration received. On the other hand, guarantee refers to a promise to answer the debt of another, in case the latter should fail to do so.

11. Checks fail to bear statement “for accommodation” or “for guarantee”
Ibasco’s theory of accommodation is debunked by the following circumstances: (1) The checks were issued after all deliveries were made at such time when the petitioner's obligation was already in existence; (2) The sum of the checks equalled the petitioner's total obligation in the amount of P51,566.40; (3) The petitioner prepared a statement of account, 34 where the checks issued were applied to his accounts due to Manuel Trivinio; (4) The act of the petitioner in issuing three checks of different dates is inconsistent to his claim 35 that Manuel Trivinio requested a post-dated check to show to his creditors; and (5) After the checks bounced, the petitioner offered a property for its replacement. All these incidents verily indicate that the checks were issued as payment and for value and not for accommodation.The checks failed to bear any statement "for accommodation" or "for guarantee" to show the petitioner's intent.

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