Haystack: Uy vs. Court of Appeals (GR 119000, 28 July 1997)

Uy vs. CA
[G.R. No. 119000. July 28, 1997.]
First Division, Bellosillo (J): 2 concurring, 2 on leave

Facts: Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the husband of Consolacion Leong. During Rosa's employment she was regarded by the Leongs as an efficient and hardworking employee. On 15 March 1982, a few months before she was to give birth, Rosa resigned. In the meantime, she helped her husband manage their lumber business. The friendly relations between Rosa and Consolacion continued. The two later agreed to form a partnership with Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the expansion of Rosa's lumber business and the latter as industrial partner. Various sums of money amounting to P500,000.00 were claimed to have been given by Consolacion for the business; however, because of the trust they had for each other, no receipt was ever issued. Thereafter a lumber store with warehouse was constructed in Bulacan, Bulacan, with funds contributed by Consolacion evidenced by various receipts. But, unfortunately, the friendship between Consolacion and Rosa turned sour when the partnership documents were never processed. As a result, Consolacion asked for the return of her investment but the checks issued by Rosa for the purpose were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Consolacion filed a complaint against Uy for estafa and for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the RTC Manila. On 10 December 1984 an Information for estafa and several other Informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against Uy. The offenses were subsequently consolidated and tried jointly. After a joint trial, the Manila RTC acquitted Uy of estafa but convicted her of the charges under BP 22. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the appeal by certiorari.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991, on the ground that the RTC Manila (Branch 32) has no jurisdiction over Criminal Case 84-32335 to 8432340, inclusive, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against Uy with the court of competent jurisdiction when warranted.

1. Rule on territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

2. Essential ingredients of BP 22 not committed in the City of Manila
None of the essential elements constitutive of violation of BP 22 was shown to have been committed in the City of Manila. The evidence presented established that (a) complainant was a resident of Makati; (b) petitioner was a resident of Caloocan City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati.

3. Estafa and violation of Bouncing Checks Law are different offenses
The crimes of estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two (2) different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.

4. Elements of estafa, violation of Bouncing Checks Law
In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required. Rather, the elements of BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

5. Court has jurisdiction over the estafa case but not violation of BP 22
Business dealings were conducted in a restaurant in Manila where sums of money were given to Uy; hence, the acquisition of jurisdiction by the lower court over the estafa case. The various charges for violation of BP 22 however are on a different plain. There is no scintilla of evidence to show that jurisdiction over the violation of BP 22 had been acquired. No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.

6. Knowledge by drawer of insufficiency of funds simultaneous to issuance of the instrument
It may be true that Violation of BP 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case the theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. However, knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument.

7. Section 3, Rule 117, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charge or over the person of the accused. Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule.

8. Jurisdiction timely questioned
Uy timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum before the RTC and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. From the Rules, even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. These objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or an appeal. It cannot be said that just because it took some 5 years before she allegedly raised the issue of jurisdiction, she would be barred by estoppel.

9. Calimlim vs. Ramirez: Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy an exception to general rule
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, the Court held that the ruling in the Sibonghanoy case is an exception to the general rule that the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court stated further that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The Court said: “A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.”

10. Sibanghanoy case: Laches present
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

11. Present circumstances different from Sibonghanoy case
The circumstances of the present case are very different from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in the present case. As a matter of fact, as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. The accused is therefore not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

	This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.